Ghana has established a “New Approach to Public Sector Reform” that aims to concentrate reform efforts on results, most notably the achievement of the government’s primary objectives of

(i) job creation and

(ii) food production, distribution, and processing.

The reform is being driven from the center of government, by the Presidency, and by improving collective cabinet level coordination, while acknowledging that execution will remain the responsibility of line ministries, who often already have well-articulated sector strategies.

These policies are mostly in line with Ghana’s two main goals and are supported by the country’s major international partners.

Public Sector Reforms in Ghana

The new approach emphasizes the need for better coordination of government activities, as well as ways to make senior managers more accountable and innovative partnerships with the private sector that could help ease the country’s tight budget.

This report outlines the findings of a four-day fact-finding tour that took place from October 4 to 8, 2010. The report is broken into the following four sections:

The report applauds the emphasis on delivering specific changes in job development, food production, delivery, and processing.

The government should consider further strengthening its delivery model, as foreshadowed in part by the “New Approach,” by establishing a delivery unit under the President’s Policy Unit to aid in central government coordination and to remove bottlenecks to essential changes.

Additionally, the report makes recommendations on how Ghana may address some specific difficulties by enhancing the Presidency’s role in supporting delivery.

Part B: Identifying and monitoring the supply chains for food production and job development, as well as illustrating the supply chain for food production and PPPs, a critical component of job creation.

The report notes that the single pay spine model adopted in Ghana is somewhat unique in terms of design and sequencing compared to those implemented in other countries and recommends deferring implementation until these issues are resolved.

The costs associated with establishing the Ghana Single Pay Spine are projected to be substantial. There will almost certainly be further refinements to the single pay spine arrangements, and some very urgent steps will need to be taken in light of the fiscal situation.

In terms of managing from the center of government, one section of the report identifies two critical roles for the center of government (defined as the President’s and Vice President’s offices, as well as the Cabinet Office): ensuring that government is “reliable” and supervising reform.

These responsibilities require severe capacity shortages, necessitating a more in-depth technical examination of staff and organizational structures.

This is a critical matter. If a high-level institution or mechanism, such as a delivery unit, is to be built at the presidency level, it must be sufficiently resilient to endure political transitions while assisting in the implementation of reforms.

It will be critical to mitigate the risks associated with this strategy, particularly in terms of duplication of units, functions, and duties, as well as the requirement for wide buy-in from key players throughout the government.

The broader public sector reforms that will almost certainly be required include more work on inter-and intra-sectoral coordination, performance management, and the use of PPPs and other efficiency measures in light of the Single Pay Spine’s fiscal ramifications.

Overview of Public Sector Reforms in Ghana

Most developing countries, including Ghana, have been implementing public sector reform (PSR) programs since the early 1980s in an effort to transform their public sector to be more productive, efficient, and effective, thereby providing world-class services to the general public and ensuring long-term national development.

Find also: Challenges of Public Sector Reforms in Ghana

In comparison to the resources, efforts, and time invested in creating and implementing these treatments, the results and outcomes have been small and usually unsatisfactory. The role of various reform institutions in each phase was investigated in this study.

To reach this goal, the study looked at the fundamental question of what the influence of Ghana’s reform institutions has been on delivering reform outcomes and results, as well as their long-term sustainability in the public sector.

In addition, the study looked at how the reform institution’s performance was affected by the way it was set up, and how both factors played a role in the documented results and outcomes.

Key people’s views on PSRs were gathered and looked at, including Ghanaian public servants, specialists who have worked with different reform institutions in different ways, and people from development partners who have been Ghana’s main source of money and technical help.

The findings of this study show that the reform institutions did not last long enough for any one political regime, which led to a lot of changes in the institutions, a lack of money and other resources for reform, and, most importantly, a lack of political will and commitment to reform.

Finally, the report suggests that Ghana’s reforms require an independent and autonomous institution. In addition, lessons have been learned and recommendations have been made for future implementation of the reform agenda in Ghana’s public sector that will ensure sustainable and successful results and outcomes based on the observations and other observations presented in this paper.

Article: This one will not only add to the body of knowledge about PSR reforms, but it will also give a detailed explanation and analysis of how reforms have worked, what they have done, and how they will work in the future.

Introduction to Public Sector Reforms in Ghana

The effectiveness and efficiency of a country’s public sector are important factors in its growth and development. Since its introduction in the early 1980s, the term “public sector reforms” has grown in popularity and become a global phenomenon.

In developing nations like Ghana, good governance and efficient public service delivery are impossible to achieve without public sector reform. Lessons from the past show that reform programs were put in place in a disconnected and sometimes inconsistent way, which led to inefficiency, unsustainable consequences, and unsatisfactory results.

Deliberations about PSR today are based on old and unsolved questions in political-administrative philosophy.

First, how important are government institutions and what effects do they have? Second, what are the underlying forces that cause governmental institutions to be established, maintained, altered, or discarded? And finally, what is the scope and under what circumstances are forms of government a result of careful design and reform? (Olsen, 2017).

The key conduits via which governments pursue their development agendas are public-sector institutions. The government, as well as all publicly controlled or supported agencies, corporations, and other entities that supply public programs, goods, and services, are considered part of the public sector.

The public sector is also defined as an entity that delivers publicly funded, owned, and operated services to the general public.

The success of national development depends on the effectiveness and efficiency of each country’s public sector. Furthermore, since its inception in the early to mid-80s, reforms in Ghana’s public sector have become commonplace.

Without restructuring the public sector, it is nearly impossible for any country to promote and/or achieve good governance and an efficient and effective system.

However, past lessons show that reform initiatives and programs were not properly executed in the latter and were fractured to some extent, resulting in reform outcomes that were disjointed, ineffectual, and generally unsustainable.

For example, in most Sub-Saharan African countries, including Ghana, the first wave of reforms concentrated primarily on structural reforms, with little or no attention paid to the impact on service delivery and other factors.

In most developing countries, political pressures frequently outweigh the great benefits of changes, causing reforms to be halted or abandoned.

On the other hand, countries with a lot of political will and political leaders who want to make changes have had real results.

Fiscal and economic crises, internal pressures, and the impact of foreign financial institutions and development partners are all factors that drive PSRs.

The philosophy of New Public Management (NPM) reform, which typically promotes the acceptance and adaption of private sector-styled management practices into public sector management, has largely influenced the creation and implementation of reforms in recent times.

Decentralization, salary and job changes, and other changes that aren’t part of the NPM have also been important (Bangura & Larbi, 2006).

1. Ghana’s Public Sector Reform Evolution

The public sector in Ghana has a number of structural, institutional, and fiduciary issues that obstruct the efficient and effective delivery of public goods and services. As a result, successive governments have attempted a number of measures aimed at reforming Ghana’s public sector.

However, the reforms didn’t achieve the change and improvement in the public sector’s performance that they were supposed to.

If you look at these changes, they can be broken into four phases: 1986–2003; 2005–2009; 2009–2017; and 2017–present. The changes were mostly driven by the supply side, and they didn’t follow any specific reform plan.

Phase 1 (from 1986 until 2003).

The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) and its offshoot, the Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme, were implemented in the first phase (CSPIP).

The National Institutional Renovation Programme (NIRP) was then implemented, which focused on comprehensive, deep-seated institutional renewal and capacity building across the public sector.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened through the Washington Consensus to introduce Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) across the continent in response to a wave of ineffectiveness in Africa’s public sector and the economic and financial crisis of the early 1980s, which prompted the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to intervene through the Washington Consensus to introduce SAPs across the continent.

The ultimate goal was to restructure the African public sector by reducing its role and size, both of which were seen as critical for macroeconomic stability (Owusu, 2012).

The CSRP, which was launched in 1987 as part of Ghana’s SAP, aims to eliminate the civil service’s functional restrictions and inadequacies in order to achieve the required transformation.

The CSPIP was created in response to the CSRP’s lackluster impact and other legislative and social events in the early 1990s.

As part of CSPIP, PIPs, which were to be new management tools for MDAs as well as blueprints for institutional capacity building, were produced as part of CSPIP.

They were to place a focus on improving service delivery, promoting accountability and outcomes-oriented practices, facilitating monitoring and evaluation, and developing built-in systems for skill training, target setting, performance assessment, and leadership.

The NIRP was the last project in this phase, and its main goal was to make sure that government institutions, as well as those that aren’t part of the government but are still part of the Republican Constitution of 1992, did their jobs in a transparent, competent, accountable, and cost-effective way.

Phase two (2005–2009):

Under the “Economic Management Capacity Building Project,” the Ministry for Public Sector Reforms was established as a central coordinating body to champion reform initiatives aimed at improving service delivery, decentralization, and subvented agency reform, among other things.

A Pricewaterhouse Coopers paper titled “PSRs: Toward a Future Strategic Framework” advised that the government designate a senior official to be responsible for the creation of PSR strategies, prompting this action.

As a result, the government at the time formed a PSR office under the supervision of the Senior Minister. As a result, a ministry was established in 2005 to oversee the PSR agenda.

This Ministry was established in recognition of the importance of PSR implementation to the government’s aim of human capital development, private sector development, and good governance.

The Ministry of Public Sector Reform (MPSR) was created to revive reform initiatives as well as to expedite and coordinate future government activities. The MPSR was supposed to make sure that all PSRs had a place to live and that the government was making progress with reform.

The Ministry devised a strategy to achieve the following essential development goals:

Providing efficient and cost-effective public services that improve the poor’s living conditions;

Creating a favorable environment and making government agencies more responsive to private-sector development; and

Increasing the capacity and efficiency of government machinery so that the executive branch can get the service it needs quickly and effectively.

(Phase 3): 2009–2017

Following the 2008 general elections that resulted in a change of government, MPSR was renamed the Public Sector Reform Secretariat (PSRS) and put under the Office of the President in 2009.

This renaming was done to recognize the organization’s importance as a tool for the Presidency to use in providing strategic and technical support for reforms, as well as to coordinate and oversee reform operations from the Presidency.

Despite the fact that the PSRS was not a ministry, the government chose a Minister of State who was also a Cabinet member to oversee the Secretariat and the reform process as a whole.

In this era, reforms were approached in a very different way. The government examined earlier reform efforts and found that, despite some small gains, there was a general gap between the outcomes and core ministerial responsibilities and that they were unaccountable.

Furthermore, the policy implementations were top-down initiatives with insufficient political leadership support.

The administration thought that this new method would eventually lead to the achievement of national development goals (Ohemeng & Ayee, 2016).

Following that, in 2013, the government decided on the New Approach to Public Sector Reforms (NAPSR), which was supposed to focus on job creation and food production, distribution, and processing.

To put it another way, sector ministers were tasked with assessing resources in order to undertake sector-specific reforms, with a focus on performance management systems.

This was based on the notion that the new reforms would allow the President to direct programs, projects, and activities to address developmental issues with the help of the Cabinet (Ohemeng & Ayee, 2016).

Phase 4 (from 2017 to the present)

Currently, the PSRS and the Office of the Senior Minister have been amalgamated (OSM). This was due to prior experience with a full-fledged Minister of Public Sector Reforms, which showed that this type of institutional organization could provide long-term effects. NPSR, 2018–2023;

2. Research Issues and questions

The primary study question was: what has been the perceived impact of reform institutions on reform outcomes and results, as well as their sustainability in Ghana’s public sector?

In addition, the following sub research questions were answered in order to reach the goal of this study:

Is it true that having a separate or independent group for PSRs will make public sector reforms more effective, sustainable, and successful?

How do Ghanaian and development partner experts who participated in the reform process assess the perceived impact of reform institutions?

How do Ghanaian public servants who are the main participants or beneficiaries of the reform process think about the perceived impact of the reform institutions they work with?

What measures and mechanisms must be put in place to ensure the efficacy and sustainability of public sector reforms in Ghana?

3. Research hypotheses

H1: The way reforms are done has an effect on how well reform institutions are doing.

H2: The way reforms are planned and carried out has an impact on how long and how well they work.

4. The Framework for Analysis

This research attempted to investigate and answer the topic of what Ghana’s reform institutions’ perceived impact and performance were and how they influenced the implementation and success of various reform programs. This concept is depicted in the following analytical framework (Figure 2).

jidc-14-2-99-g2 A framework for analyzing the sustainability and success of reforms. Download the Original Figure

5. Definitions: Definition and Justification of Conceptual and Theoretical Public Sector Reform

According to Schacter (2000), PSR is about addressing and resolving these issues, as well as strengthening the public sector’s management. Schacter, 2000). PSRs are a critical component of governments’ ongoing attempts to modernize the public sector, making it more citizen-focused and responsive (Schacter, 2000).

It also says that “PSR” is “deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations with the goal of improving their performance.” Structural changes may include merging or splitting public sector organizations, while process changes include redesigning systems and focusing on capacity building.

Essentially, PSRs serve two purposes: they align the government’s vision with the traditional roles and functions of the state in society – issues of “what to do” – and they improve the systems and processes by which these functions are carried out to make them more efficient, effective, transparent, and accountable – issues of “how to do” it (Therkildsen, 2008). Additionally, PSRs result in a functional, result-oriented, and value-based government.

For example, financial reforms ensure prudent resource management and cost effectiveness; administrative reforms result in more responsive and effective service delivery; and trade reforms result in increased trade volumes and a possible influx of foreign direct investment (Andrews, 2013).

6. Theoretical Underpinnings

1) Institutional provisions for reform: An institutional point of view

Typically, institutions emerge as a result of decisions taken by a single actor or a group of actors and interest groups. Institutionalism elucidates how current political-administrative institutions might be understood, the extent to which they have autonomous and sustained effects, and the procedures that govern their establishment, management, and modification (Olsen, 2017).

The concept of institution analysis is important to political science and public administration, and there has been a rise of interest in recent years in why and how institutions matter and make a difference.

When attempting to comprehend institutions, there are numerous perspectives to examine.

The opposing perspectives place a premium on distinct units of analysis—the features of political players, the societal process, and already established institutional structures (Olsen, 2017) [as mentioned in Goodin, 1996), Rhodes et al., 2006), and Peters, 2012]. Alternative perspectives, according to March and Olsen (1989), see public institutions as a means for comprehensive knowledge, force, and redistribution; for regulating and facilitating effective exchange; and for defining acceptable acts.

Reformers, on the whole, have durable, dependable, and steady aims that transcend time; they also grasp how institutional structure and arrangements affect performance and success.

Finally, they have the power to take the steps needed to reach their goals and get the results they want. This is what Olsen, 2017, says about these people.

Additionally, reforms entail not just changes to organizations, systems, and processes, but also changes to the general public’s mentalities, norms, and attitudes.

This is why Thomas Hobbes came up with the Leviathan governance system, which had a centralized and autonomous authority. He thought that a society of people without institutions that set and change the rules and standards would be uncomfortable.

2) Reform-related institutional arrangements: Establishment of an independent agency

The responsiveness of government institutions to elected officials and voters is a critical aspect of democratic governance, and a significant source of variance in responsiveness is the institution’s form (Selin, 2015).

Institutions are developed as a consequence of deliberate and considered decisions and are utilized as one of the policy tools by political and administrative actors to accomplish the desired ends and results of public policies.

Two assumptions underpin institutional design: first, the institution’s structure is a substantial predictor of human choices; and second, are human choices significant predictors of institutional forms (Olsen, 1997).

Due to the comprehensive nature of PSRs, sustained efforts and strong organizational capacities are required to maintain attention, organize resources, and overcome resistance (March & Olsen, 1983).

In other words, the haste with which reforms are implemented and the stringent and short-term implementation timetables imposed by donors frequently diminish the quality of the results.

In the case of developing countries such as Ghana, progressive implementation will be considerably more desirable than the “big bang” strategy.

Over the previous few decades, the agency model has resulted in the transfer of government functions to agency-type organizations that are vertically specialized outside of ministerial departments. Agencification offers a way for governments to decouple from their routine role of formulating and implementing policies.

Governments can now concentrate on policy creation, such as PSRs, while autonomous agencies carry out the policies with less political interference, greater autonomy, and supervision.

Again, establishing independent institutions to oversee government programs such as PSRs will result in the avoidance or elimination of negative elements that impede successful implementation, continuity, and sustainability of reforms.

As a general rule, reform programs must be properly institutionalized in order to work and last for a long time.

According to Roness (2001), it is critical to explore the distinction between substantive policies that affect people directly, like health policy, and policy areas that influence people indirectly, like PSR policies.

This divide has been expanded in recent talks on NPM, which advocate for “separate institutions for policy advice, regulation, and service delivery” (Roness, 2001).

3) Reform-related institutional arrangements: Institutional adaptability

Institutions are continuously under attack and pressure from both internal and external sources, and institutional strength and outstanding performance alone do not ensure continued high performance. Institutions must spend money on new ideas and development to be able to adapt and balance an ever-changing and unpredictable world.

As noted previously, the two (2) key characteristics of institutional adaptation are its capacity for innovation and continual improvement. To begin with, innovation investment prioritizes “cutting-edge” improvements to policies, procedures, and processes, as well as attitudes, that will result in long-term institutional performance improvement.

This also necessitates anticipatory planning and preparation for anticipated environmental changes.

For instance, the growing demand for basic services such as passports, business registration permits and certificates, and driver’s licenses would necessitate the introduction or shift to innovative approaches such as system automation and business process reengineering in general to improve service delivery and mitigate the challenges associated with manual systems.

Finally, ongoing improvement of an institution’s internal systems, processes, and structure is critical and a determinant of the institution’s ability to adapt to evolving demands, priorities, standards, and environments.

A programmatic response and an integrated process for continuous improvement must be used to make sure that the performance of an institution can keep up with changing conditions.

4) Institutional arrangements related to reform: Institutional stability

Stability refers to an institution’s ability to mitigate unstable performance through the institutionalization of best practices and standards, as well as to identify and mitigate threats from both internal and external sources.

By putting in place best practices and new norms, stable institutions can lessen volatility and irregularities in their performance and resource use (UNDP B.f., 2011).

In essence, sustained and consistent institutional performance is contingent upon the systematization of innovative metrics, institutional arrangements, methodologies, and other tried-and-established initiatives.

Performance indicators show how an institution is using its resources. Stability measures show how the institution will improve over time.

5) The effectiveness and performance of the institution

The performance of an institution relates to how successfully and efficiently it operates and accomplishes its mission.

The efficacy of an institution can be determined by the standards it sets and the services it provides.

On the other hand, efficiency can be quantified by the clarity of the organization’s mission, functions, and mandate; resource mobilization and usage; responsiveness; and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

According to research, an institution’s ability to defuse a crisis involves three (3) crucial attributes: performance, adaptability, and stability.

While institutional performance is necessary for a nation to function and fulfill its obligations to its population, it is insufficient as a strategy or means for governments that must respond to unanticipated shocks and an ever-changing environment.

Stable and flexible institutions are required for the development of a robust and resilient nation with commensurate structures. Additionally, strong institutions capable of providing basic public services and formulating and implementing policies are critical to countries’ efforts to achieve their developmental goals, even more so during times of crisis (UNDP B. f., 2011).

The efficiency and effectiveness of public institutions serve as the foundation for a nation’s capacity to manage the functions of its executive and legislative branches in overseeing the economy, providing social services, and utilizing natural resources sustainably to improve citizens’ livelihoods.

The benefit of increased efficiency goes beyond quantifiable cost savings, as recent research has established a direct link between the public sector’s operational efficiency and economic growth. In other words, increased efficiency in public sector organizations improves the government’s image, public confidence, and acceptability (UNDP B. f., 2011).

6) Theorem of the resource-based perspective

Numerous resource constraints confront public institutions, necessitating deliberate planning and implementation of solutions to ensure their continued functioning and viability. Rose et al. (2010) say that both tangible and intangible resources are used by an organization to choose and implement a strategy.

According to the RBV theory, resources are unique, precious, one-of-a-kind, and irreplaceable advantages that contribute to an institution’s competitive advantage (Rose et al., 2010).

Pesic (2007) gives four (4) qualities of resources within the scope of RBV to substantiate this definition.

To begin, resources are valued and are thus employed to capitalize on opportunities and/or mitigate an institution’s environmental concerns.

Second, they are unusual characteristics among an institution’s current and potential competitors. Thirdly, each institution’s resources are distinct.

Finally, they are distinct and one-of-a-kind, which means that no other service or product can perform the same function (Pesic, 2007).

The most important thing to remember here is that the success of an institution is based on how well it manages its resources and comes up with new ways to do so.

The RBV theory’s primary tenet is that institutional variation is due to the fact that institutions retain a diverse range of internal resources on which they rely to operate. An institution’s resources and potential provide it with a competitive edge (Pesic, 2007).

However, detractors of the RBV theory have raised issues about certain aspects of the model, arguing that it fails to examine the managerial implications of the resources.

Additionally, they claim that its applicability is too limited and that sustaining a competitive advantage is impractical and impossible.

Additionally, they argue that the four (4) characteristics of resources are neither necessary nor sufficient for an institution to maintain a competitive edge. In order to come up with good theory, the value of a resource isn’t known yet.

7) The new reform of public administration

The NPM reforms have had a significant impact on PSRs in a number of nations worldwide, including Ghana, although the adoption and application of their principles vary by country (Moon & Kim, 2011).

NPM emerged in the late 1970s and continues to be one of the most prominent international paradigms in public administration to this day. According to Hood, its emergence could be attributed to four (4) administrative “megatrends,” namely:

Attempts to decrease or eliminate government growth in terms of spending and staffing;

A shift away from government’s core institutions and toward privatization and quasi-privatization, which separates public service delivery from government; this is called privatization or quasi-privatization.

Informatization of public service creation and delivery; and

The emergence of a broader global agenda is increasingly focused on broad concerns of public administration, policy design, decision-making methods, and intergovernmental cooperation (Hood, 1991).

In his study on NPM, Hong (2013), titled “Die Hard” Legacy? NPM Reform and Administrative Law in Korea, contends that numerous experts have predicted the downfall of NPM and a move to Post-NPM governance in the twenty-first century.

He adds, however, that NPM has proven to be more resilient and viable than anticipated. He highlighted three causes for the NPM’s remarkable persistence.

To begin, one of the NPM’s most notable doctrines is aimed at making governments more competitive and encouraging them to adopt a “small but capable” or “doing more with less” government ideology.In other words, political leaders believe it is wise and politically correct to gravitate toward this ideology and utilize it to push for transformation.

Second, private sector innovation and breakthroughs have increased the pressure on the public sector to benchmark and implement best practices, private sector-style management, and service delivery.

Finally, NPM was viewed as a tool for achieving the common good, owing to widespread support and mounting pressure on governments to reform (Hong, 2013).

To restate Roness’s point, we must distinguish substantive policy areas from policy areas such as PSR. Policy advice, regulation, and delivery of public services must be provided by separate entities (Roness, 2001).

A major NPM argument in support of this institutional design is that such establishments may concentrate on efficiently carrying out their primary mandates and functions without interference from policymaking, assessment, and so on.

Additionally, by separating their functions from central government, managers will be relieved of onerous administrative and bureaucratic constraints, enabling them to manage professionally (Therkildsen, 2008).

1. METHODOLOGY

The authors used a case study approach to examine the emergence of PSRs and the corresponding institutional structures used to conduct reform programs in Ghana.

This approach gave a detailed assessment of the elements that contributed to the reforms’ effectiveness, the lessons learned, and the outcomes recorded.

It also helped researchers figure out if the institutions’ ability to produce successful and long-term results was affected by the ways they were set up for reform implementation.

The methodology used in this study was determined by the availability of various actors in the public sector and the research approach.

The study and analysis of primary and secondary data includes the use of an online survey, semi-structured interviews, and pertinent documents.

The main data collected provided the study with an authentic source of data because it was gathered directly and used for its intended purpose.

This study analyzed qualitative data rather than quantitative data because the sample size was small (under 100) and the respondents were not randomly selected. Both technologies used a purposeful and targeted sampling strategy to acquire primary data.

The majority of the people who took part in the study were Ghanaian public servants, officials from the current reform institution, experts who had worked with the reform institutions in the past, and World Bank officials who had been very involved in Ghana’s reform efforts over the years.

The research data were gathered using an online questionnaire and a semi-structured interview questionnaire, and they were organized and gathered in the following manner, as previously stated:

People who work for the government in Ghana took part in an online survey to get their thoughts on Ghana’s reform institutions and how they’ve worked to improve the public sector over the years.

Three (3) groups were interviewed using semi-structured interview questions: selected officers of Ghana’s reform institutions; experts who have worked with the reform institutions in technical or administrative capacities; and some World Bank officials who have been heavily involved in Ghana’s reform interventions.

The first premise of data collection in a case study research design, according to Yin (2014), is the use of multiple sources of evidence.

It’s a good thing that case study data can be used to look at a wide range of historical and behavioral issues while still making sure the study is high-quality and trustworthy.

The convergence of many sources of evidence enhances the research findings’ validity and dependability.

As mentioned previously, this research investigated and analyzed documents in addition to data collected via questionnaires. The data and methodological triangulation approach used in this study is illustrated in Figure 3 below.

2) Respondents’ profiles in in-depth interviews

(1) Group 1-Officials of Ghana’s public sector reform directorate (PSRD), which is located in the office of the senior minister.

The respondents from the PSRD in Ghana were four (4) senior management staff members, including the Acting Chief Director, who serves as administrative head, the Director in charge of Finance and Administration, a Deputy Director, and an Assistant Director (Respondent 4), who are responsible for PSRs and other projects.

These officials have been involved in management and decision-making with Ghana’s reform institutions for between five (5) and ten (10) years, during which time they have witnessed institutional changes and political regimes.

(2) Group 2-Ghanaian reform experts

The second group targeted for data collection were people who had previously worked with Ghana’s reform institutions in a variety of capacities, including technical and advisory roles, as well as done academic research or studies on Ghana’s reforms.

Three (3) respondents with varying levels of work experience and involvement in government changes were interviewed. Their tenure ranged from six (6) months to ten (10) years.

(3) World Bank officials from Group 3

The World Bank’s respondents were both Senior Public Sector Specialists with a combined experience of fifteen (15) and seventeen (17) years in government reform. They have primarily been concerned with giving general and technical advice and helping governments.

III. ANALYSIS BASED ON THE HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Research Hypotheses Affirmation

This study tested two basic hypotheses: that there is a relationship between institutional arrangements for reform and the performance of reform institutions; and that this relationship results in lasting and successful reforms.

H1: The way reforms are done has an effect on how well reform institutions are doing.

According to the study, institutional preparations for changes included the institution’s kind, its available resources for reforms, its stability, and its adaptability. On all metrics of institutional arrangements, it was seen that Ghana’s reform institutions’ procedures and approach did not adequately position them to function properly and provide the desired goals.

In terms of institutional form, all preceding institutions lacked autonomy and were unstable—none of them outlived the political governments that established them.

At one stage, resources for reform initiatives were made available through public and donor funding, but the outcomes were modest, and the government failed to adequately resource reform institutions following this phase.

Additionally, it was discovered that the previous institutions’ incapacity to perform in future conditions and meet the rising needs of the public sector by matching their priorities and interventions contributed to a feeling that the institutions had outlived their usefulness and significance.

In light of this data, this hypothesis holds true: the institutional arrangements established for reform institutions have a significant impact on the institution’s performance.

H2: The way reforms are planned and carried out has an impact on how long and how well they work.

The efficacy and performance of an institution are crucial to achieving its aims and goals. Additionally, this study proved that institutional structures have an effect on the institution’s performance.

According to poll respondents, prior reform institutions operated admirably and had a moderately satisfactory impact. Apart from this assessment, it was noted that certain reform measures achieved minimal results despite their potential to do so.

Thus, if the institutional arrangements for reforms are well thought out, they will have a big and positive impact on how well the reform institutions work and how well they achieve long-term and successful reform outcomes.

2. Research Questions and Their Answers

The study’s central research issue is what the perceived influence of reform institutions has been on achieving reform outcomes and results, as well as on their sustainability in Ghana’s public sector. This section contains an overall assessment.

According to the studied literature, Ghana established a PSR Secretariat in 2003 within the newly constituted portfolio of the Senior Minister between 2000 and 2004.

This Secretariat could be considered the first institutional agency established in Ghana to promote changes. T

he flagship reform method was founded on the NIRP, which was initiated in 1994 with the goal of converting Ghana’s public sector from an input-oriented to an output-oriented and results-oriented organization.

Additionally, the government commissioned Pricewaterhouse Coopers to examine and identify the state of the public sector, as well as the implications of “upscaling” reform interventions as a sustainable means of achieving the public sector’s transformation.

Price water house Coopers wrote a paper in 2003 called “PSRs: Towards a Future Strategic Framework” that said that a ministerial portfolio should be set up to oversee the development of PSR policies.

In response, the then-current government established the Secretariat and put it under the OSM, who possessed considerable influence and the requisite clout to get things done. As a result, MPSR was established in 2005 with a substantive Minister to take over the PSR agenda.

This occurred as a result of the government’s recognition that PSR implementation was crucial to achieving its objective of human capital development, private sector development, and good governance.

The MPSR became the “institutional home” for all PSRs and was tasked with the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of public sector reforms.

Numerous interventions from the previous setup were taken over by the new one. They were implemented in a visible and public way.

These include pay and pension reforms; decentralization; service improvement reforms; business process reengineering; subverted agencies reform; civil service reform; and human resource management reforms.

In 2009, the MPSR was renamed the PSRS and transferred to the President’s Office. This was in acknowledgement of the institution’s importance as a vehicle through which the Presidency could give strategic and technical support for reforms, as well as coordinate and oversee Presidency-led reform actions.

Other factors that influenced this resignation were the new government’s assessment of previous reform interventions, which revealed modest and somewhat unsatisfactory results and outcomes, a general disconnect between outcomes and mainstream ministerial responsibilities, and a lack of accountability for previous efforts.

To summarize, the former institution implemented policies top-down, whereas the new institution implemented policies bottom-up. Several prior reform efforts, such as service delivery improvement, subverted agencies reform, and human resource management reform, were continued concurrently with the NAPSR.

This strategy was slightly different from previous ones in that it was developed around a new sector-driven route that prioritized job development, food production, distribution, and processing changes.

Finally, following a change in administration in March 2017, the PSRS was amalgamated into the OSM as a Directorate.

As a result of the literature review and data collection, the following trends and findings were made: To begin with, the overall performance and influence of the various reform institutions has been modest, if not poor, and their outcomes have been unrelated to the resources and efforts expended. Second, it is also abundantly clear that the various political regimes reconstructed institutions arbitrarily and at will because it was not a priority on their political agendas.

Third, DPs provided the majority of resources, and the justification and urge for specific reform interventions, as well as the supplementary resources and commitment from successive governments, diminished with time, resulting in reform fatigue among all stakeholders.

As for resources, the reform institutions didn’t have enough money or the right skills to make changes, which led to their poor results.

In general, the lack of consistency, truncation, and sustainability of reform interventions, which is primarily the fault of political actors, had a significant impact on the intended impact and output of the various reform institutions.It is apparent, however, that the tenure and period during which the reform institution was a ministry produced superior achievements and outcomes, and that had these efforts been sustained in a deliberate and planned manner, Ghana’s situation today would be much different.

The findings confirm what March & Olsen (1983) stated; they underline that PSRs are comprehensive in nature and, as such, require long-term efforts and strong organizational competencies to maintain attention, deploy necessary resources, adapt to, and overcome resistance (March & Olsen, 1983).

Additionally, the World Bank validates these findings. They emphasized the fact that one in every three PSR efforts or programs in Africa has failed to be satisfying and sustainable (www.worldbank.org/publicsector/civil service/strategies.htm).

In other words, while the study’s conclusions are realistic in light of the considerable effort and resources committed to implementing reforms in Ghana’s public sector, its results, outcomes, success, and sustainability are not encouraging.

In spite of the fact that it costs more than the “big bang” method, an incremental implementation strategy is a good choice for policies like PSRs.

3. Detailed Responses to Sub-Research Questions

Is it true that having a separate or independent group for PSRs will make public sector reforms more effective, sustainable, and successful?

According to the study, the majority of respondents (experts, officials of PSRD-OSM, and public servants) believe that Ghana urgently needs an independent institution for reforms, preferably one that is self-governing, adaptable, and immune to political interference or other unpredictable external factors. They feel that is the only viable alternative for Ghana if reforms are to be sustained and effective.

First, Ghana already had enough institutions, so the next step is to focus on implementing a reform strategy and making people more accountable for the results. Second, the current institution that helps with reforms (OSM-PSRD) isn’t long-term, so if the government changes after the 2020 elections, the reforms could be put on hold.

These findings are consistent with the tenets of agencification, which are also central to the NPM reform paradigm. Agencification offers an alternative to decoupling the government’s mundane functions of policy formulation and implementation. Governments can now concentrate on developing policies such as PSRs while an independent body administers them with less political interference, increased autonomy, coerciveness, and oversight.

In addition, by setting up an independent reform organization to coordinate, facilitate, and implement PSRs, the negative factors that have kept them from being effective, long-lasting, and sustainable will be reduced or eliminated, as they have been in the past.

How do Ghanaian and development partner experts who participated in the reform process assess the perceived impact of reform institutions?

According to the experts, reform institutions have had a moderate impact and could have achieved more if certain preconditions were in place and a greater emphasis was placed on implementation outcomes and results.

For example, they indicated a degree of apathy and resistance to change among public institutions and workers; a lack of understanding of the benefits of reforms, which can be attributed to the first point; underfunding of reform institutions as a result of political leadership’s lack of interest and commitment; and staffing of reform institutions that was not entirely competent to carry out reform interventions.

Furthermore, World Bank officers stated that with the support and commitment of political leadership, the reform institutions could have accomplished more.

Government at the highest level must demand that proposed reforms be implemented and that those charged with implementation meet expectations and are accountable.

They said that even with good advice from consultants and DPs, the technical capacity of reform institutions was very limited, even though they had good ideas.

How do Ghanaian public servants who are the main participants or beneficiaries of the reform process think about the perceived impact of the reform institutions they work with?

The findings from the perspectives of public servants, who can be considered the primary actors and/or beneficiaries of the various PSRs, indicate that the overall impact of the various reform institutions has been negligible, non-tangible, and average, with the majority dissatisfied with the outputs in light of the resources and efforts invested by successive governments, DPs, and all stakeholders.

They contended, however, that certain interventions, such as pay reforms, pension reforms, service delivery improvement reforms, civil service reforms, human resource management reforms, and public financial management reforms, could be considered moderately successful with room for improvement.

Finally, they suggested that the current institutional arrangement for the reform institution is ineffective and unsustainable, which was corroborated by one of the World Bank’s officials.

What measures and mechanisms must be put in place to ensure the efficacy and sustainability of public sector reforms in Ghana?

According to the experts, the following measures should be implemented as prerequisites to ensure effective and sustainable reform implementation and outcomes: there is a need to raise awareness of the benefits of change among all stakeholders; reform interventions should be designed and implemented collaboratively with stakeholders rather than being imposed; legislation should be enacted to establish a framework to support PSRs; and there is a need to appoint an expert.

According to World Bank officials, if all of the problems with previous reform institutions are solved, the government should give the public a chance to see how well it has done.

There should also be a demand for accountability at all levels of government for proposed reforms; all political actors must value and work toward PSRs; and adequate funds and incentives should be provided.

1. Lessons, Recommendations, and Conclusion
2. Lessons

The main point of this study is that the lack of continuity and sustainability in reform institutions and reform interventions is a big reason why the public sector in Ghana doesn’t work as well as it should and doesn’t get the results that people want.

Another lesson learned is that in order to undertake reform interventions effectively, sustainably, and successfully, it is necessary to develop an autonomous reform institution that is self-governing and free of political influence and unwelcome changes.

This is further bolstered by the argument of Thomas, who argued that the creation of a distinct organization for reforms will erase politics from government initiatives, and an independent institution will provide a stable channel for funds with clear lines of accountability.

From the past experience, it is observed that Ghana adopted mostly centralized in-government agencies and semiautonomous types of institutional forms.

These institutional forms could not outlive political regimes and suffered at-will and indiscriminate restructuring and reorganization. Thus, an autonomous institution is the only path and option left for Ghana if better outcomes and results are to be achieved.

The commitment and support of political leadership are also emphasized as a critical factor in ensuring the success of public sector reforms in Ghana.

Reforms should not compete with other government priorities; rather, they should be viewed as a necessity and imperative if desired transformation, productivity, and improved public service delivery are to be achieved.

In Ghana, it looks like the government is on board with the development and launch of a five-year reform strategy that aims to “improve the public sector’s performance to ensure long-term national development and also reorient public sector actors and institutions to foster rapid gains in private sector competitiveness” (NPSR, 2018, p. 1).

Although resources were made available for reform implementation, particularly during the time of the MPSR, the average results documented, along with governments’ declining commitment and insufficient counterpart funding, left successive reform organizations cash-strapped.

The technical competencies and capacity of the reform institution’s human capital were also insufficient for effective implementation. Reform actions are expensive and necessitate proper funding.

According to Rose et al. (2010), resources are distinctive and irreplaceable advantages that contribute to an institution’s competitive advantage (Rose et al., 2010).

The main idea of this argument is that an institution’s resources play a big role in how efficient, effective, and successful it is. All of these factors contribute to the institution’s long-term competitive advantage.

Again, this would be a pointless endeavor if the suggested autonomous institution for change were not accompanied by the necessary infrastructure.

To begin with, it is clear from the findings that the various reform institutions were not founded correctly by law but were created at the demand of political actors, resulting in the widespread rearrangement they suffered.

Thus, it is necessary to establish the reform institution properly through legislation and to provide an acceptable legal foundation to justify its operations.

Finally, monitoring and evaluation were not a critical component of the institutional framework and were thus extremely poor or non-existent at times. Having monitoring and evaluation built into the structure of the reform institution is very important.

The institution should also build a framework for monitoring and evaluating the outcomes of its work.

2. Recommendations

To ensure the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of PSRs in Ghana’s public sector, as well as the transformation and results desired by all, the reform institution must be repositioned and capacitated with the necessary resources, most notably highly competent and technical staff, to enable it to facilitate, coordinate, and implement public sector reforms in an efficient, effective, and results-oriented manner.

In essence, the current situation necessitates not just a suitable structural organization but also a new institutional setup.

Second, the institution must be given a legal mandate to operationalize its functions and obligations, as well as the authority and authority to deliver and be accountable. These changes will help the reforms last for a long time, as well as protect the institution from political administration changes.

Finally, public sector workers, residents, and other stakeholders must be educated and made aware of the shared benefits of reforms in order to make them feel like they have a stake in the changes and change their attitude.

3. Conclusion

The institution’s type, resources, and adaptability have all been regarded as critical to the reform institution’s effectiveness and the achievement of successful PSR outcomes and results.

Concentrating attention on these critical factors will result in improved outcomes and results for Ghana’s reform efforts.

This is critical because the lessons learned from previous methods of public sector reform leave much to be desired; it is envisioned that this new methodology will ensure success and advancement.

It is important to point out that the proposed institutional form should be autonomous, self-governing, and independent of politics and bad situations.

Indeed, building an autonomous organization is insufficient on its own, as additional considerations must be addressed.

There is a need to establish and implement a change management plan; the proposed institutions must communicate with and collaborate with all important and key stakeholders and political actors; and the institution’s technical capacity should be enhanced to match world-class standards.

Finally, the political will, dedication, and support of the people of Ghana must be sought to make sure that the public sector in Ghana is successful and long-lasting.

1. Reference

2. Reference